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I. INTRODUCTION
1

The Electoral College is a marvel of political thought, which provides all
states—regardless of size—with the power to influence the national election
of the President and Vice President of the United States.2 Our Founders
established a system of checks and balances on the power of the federal
government through the separation of enumerated powers between the
three branches.3 The structural protection of federalism, created from
splitting the powers between the state and federal governments, further
shielded the citizens from tyranny by the federal government.4 Specifically,
1. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives
to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . . .”). It is worth noting, that the original plan for
the president did not even involve the Electoral College. In fact, as noted during the discussion on
what would become Section 2 of Article II, the original plan amounted to the president being elected
by a joint ballot of the members of legislature present at that time and he would hold office for a single
seven-year term. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 511 (Max Farrand ed.,
Yale University Press 1966) [hereinafter RECORDS] (noting the comments related to the report of the
Committee of Eleven, indicating how Mr. Rutledge wanted to scrap the proposed election process and
use the original proposed plan: “He shall be elected by joint ballot by the Legislature to which election
a majority of the votes of the members present shall be required: He shall hold his office during the
term of Seven years; but shall not be elected a second time” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
2. Ronald D. Rotunda, How the Electoral College Works—and Why It Works Well, CATO
(Nov. 13, 2000), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/how-electoral-college-works-whyit-works-well [https://perma.cc/L624-97YV] (“[The Founders] created the Electoral College to
protect the residents of the smaller states, and they rejected government by simple majority because
plebiscites historically have been the tool of dictatorships, not democracy.”).
3. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (granting the legislative power to the Congress and splitting it into
two chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (vesting the executive
power with the President of the United States and providing for a vice president to serve alongside
him); id. art. III, § 1, cl. 1 (vesting the judicial power in the Supreme Court).
4. The genius of our Founding Fathers is unparalleled in their understanding that man, at his
very core, will always be corrupted by power—which explains why they split the power of our
government into several branches. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”);
id. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”); see also ROBERT A. CARO,
MASTER OF THE SENATE: THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON III, at 9 (2002) (retelling an apocryphal
discussion between George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, in which Washington opined that
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regarding the Electoral College, the Founding Fathers feared that without
proper protections in selecting the president, a cabal of corrupt individuals
could usurp the will of the people. Thus, the Fathers developed the
Electoral College.5
Regarding the election of our chief executive, the Founders were
especially protective. They sought to create not one individual election—
easily swayable and subject to corruption—but numerous, simultaneous
elections in each state, with the chief objective of offering more protection
from corruption by an evil cabal. Each of the fifty states is tasked with
creating their own election laws and the means by which electors are
selected.6 Further, each state will have its electors meet at a location (likely
the state’s capital) in each respective state to cast ballots to elect the
President of the United States and Vice President of the United States, then
transmit those results to the “Seat of the Government of the United States,”
where the votes will be counted and certified under the eye of the
President of the Senate.7
While such a scheme is, of course, not without faults8, our system of
electing the president and vice president—albeit an indirect process—
ensures that neither a cabal of powerful men nor a tyranny of the majority
will ever be permitted to elect someone whom a majority of the states do
not want as the president. It is paramount that the reader understands, and
thereby conveys to the public, that it is the will of a majority of states, and
not the will of a majority of the population, that is required in electing the
president. This is the check and balance of power amongst the populace,
because to require anything other than a majority of the states to elect the
president would subject the people to the will of a few states, which are
Congress is split into two chambers to allow the passionate legislation from the House to be poured
into the Senate to cool it, as one would do with hot tea into a saucer). But see U.S. CONST. amend. XVII
(removing one layer of protection against the consolidation of power by the senators directly elected).
However, not all men assume the office of president through elections, such as President Chester A.
Arthur, who ascended to the office after the assassination of James A. Garfield. Austin W. Halvorson,
Yellowstone 1883: Historical Background, THE RANCHER (Jan. 4, 2022) (available on Spotify.com).
5. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 499–501 (detailing fears several of the Founding Fathers held
regarding the proposed system of electing the president and vice president).
6. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
7. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. See generally, Joe Rogan and H.R. McMasters, #1763—General H.R.
McMasters, JOE ROGAN EXPERIENCE (Jan. 13, 2022) (available on Spotify.com) (discussing the
peaceful transition of power as facilitated by the Congress through the certification of the Electoral
College votes).
8. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton) (“If [the Electoral College] be not perfect,
it is at least excellent.”).
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small in number but large in population (e.g., California and New York). As
Hamilton wrote, speaking as Publius in Federalist No. 68, “It was equally
desirable, that the immediate election should be made by men most capable
of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and acting under
circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of
all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their choice.”9
The Electoral College is a paramount safeguard of federalism and the
separation of powers, which must be protected from movements—such as
the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact10—that only seek to destroy
this separation and undermine the sagacious wisdom of our Founders.
Proponents of such movements seem to overlook the imperative and
dominant purpose behind the Electoral College: acting as a check and
balance on power in our Republic between the several states in determining
the president.11 Therefore, there should be no question that attempts to
undermine the Electoral College would violate the Constitution. Thus, if
parties feel strongly enough about a national popular vote, they should
change the Constitution through the one clear method allowed to change
the election process—amending the Constitution.12 It should be noted, this
Author is not of the opinion that the Electoral College needs to be changed;
rather, it is this Author’s opinion that the Electoral College is one of the
greatest legacies of our Founding Fathers, which has protected citizens of
the United States from the tyranny of the majority for over two hundred
years.
9. Id. (explaining further, “A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the
general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such
complicated investigations”).
10. Darrell M. West, It’s Time to Abolish the Electoral College, BROOKINGS (Oct. 15, 2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/bigideas/its-time-to-abolish-the-electoral-college/ [https://
perma.cc/XRF2-EQJ6] (“One such mechanism [to abolish the Electoral College] that a number of
states already support is an interstate pact that honors the national popular vote.”).
11. Jessica Kline, The Essential Electoral College, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Sep. 14, 2020),
https://www.heritage.org/election-integrity/commentary/the-essential-electoral-college
[https://
perma.cc/48GD-5X64] (detailing briefly the essential role of the Electoral College, urging readers to
realize the import of its preservation); see also Norman R. Williams, The Danger of the National Popular
Vote Compact, HARV. L. REV.: BLOG (Mar. 13, 2019), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/the-dangerof-the-national-popular-vote-compact/ [https://perma.cc/NN9A-7HLC] (commentating on the
dangers of the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, stating, “In my view, it is unconstitutional
for states to appoint electors . . . in accordance with the will of voters outside the state. . . . [T]he
NPVC will invite litigation on a far greater scale . . than what the nation witnessed in [Bush v. Gore]”).
12. See U.S. CONST. art. V. (providing technically for two methods of amending the
Constitution: (1) amendments proposed by Congress, or (2) amendments proposed by an Article V
Convention of States).
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To restate the infallible wisdom of Hamilton, “The judiciary, on the
contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction
either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active
resolution whatever.”13 The citizenry should neither turn to the Court nor
to backhanded means of subverting the Constitution to achieve their desired
political goals; instead, they should turn to the amendment process. This
two-century old wisdom aside, however, the Electoral College is continually
under attack, and even Members of Congress call to end the Framers’
electoral machinery.14 The purpose of this Comment is to identify the
attacks on our Republic and to assist those interested in understanding how
some persons seek to undermine our electoral process.
Ultimately, this Comment will address the potential threat the citizens of
our Republic face from the attempted usurpations of the Electoral College.
The remainder of Part I will address the history of the Electoral College as
well as address the boundaries of this Comment. Elections should lend to
peaceful transitions of power, but too often they are tumultuous events.
Indeed, almost every election is embroiled in some form of attempted
usurpation of the will of the people, yet this Comment will be limited to the
Electoral College as it relates to Chiafalo v. Washington.15 Part II will address
the Electoral College process and early powers of states over electors.
Part III addresses the perceived impact of Chiafalo on faithless elector laws.
Part IV introduces the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact. Part V
discusses the potential impacts of Chiafalo on faithless electors and the
efforts to institute a national popular vote. Lastly, Part VI provides a brief
conclusion and prediction regarding faithless electors.
A. The Historical Foundation of the Electoral College
From the founding of the Republic, drafting of the Constitution, and
through to the present day, the concern over the election of the chief
executive is firmly fixed in the minds of the nation’s most prominent
figures.16 Regarding the appointment of “the Chief Magistrate of the
13. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
14. Benjamin Fearnow, Adam Schiff Tells Bill Maher Abolishing Electoral College an ‘Overdue’
Constitutional Change, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 10, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/adam-schiff-tells-billmaher-abolishing-electoral-college-overdue-constitutional-change-1538051 [https://perma.cc/5PN4EE4C] (describing Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee Congressman Adam Schiff’s desire
to abolish the Electoral College).
15. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020).
16. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 8 (discussing the manner in which the chief
executive shall be selected); Russell Wheeler, Can the Electoral College be Subverted by
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United States,” the leading figures of the Founding Era noted that
establishing the process of appointment for this position was an onerous
battle to procure during the Constitutional Convention.17 Without a doubt,
the adoption of our Constitution was difficult; its implementation was filled
with deep negotiation, politicking, and at times, sheer lack of resolution due
to obligations delegates owed to their home states.18
The main story behind the promulgation of the present clause starts on
Friday, August 31, 1787, with the motion of Mr. Roger Sherman of
Connecticut, prior to the adjournment of the House, that a Committee of
Eleven19 be appointed to take up and address remaining parts of the
Constitution—including the formation of the clause affecting electors.20
This Committee of Eleven did not present a report upon the election of the
president and vice president until Tuesday, September 4, 1787.21 The
honorable Mr. Brearley presented the Committee’s report, starting with the
discussion of impeachments and Indian treaties.22
After several motions and votes to approve other clauses suggested by
Mr. Brearley and the Committee of Eleven, the members moved to
postpone the discussion on the “mode of electing the President . . . .”23 Of
note, one suggestion in the early discussion proposed that in the event one
fails to receive a majority of electors, “then from the five highest on the list,
the Senate shall choose by ballot the President.”24 Second, after electing
the president, the vote for vice president would take place, and “should
remain two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from

“Faithless Electors”?, BROOKINGS (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/
10/21/can-the-electoral-college-be-subverted-by-faithless-electors/ [https://perma.cc/2NL2-GBA7]
(questioning the Electoral College and partially analyzing the history of the body).
17. See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2320 (reviewing the Constitutional Convention of 1787,
Justice Kagan identified the difficulties the delegates faced upon deciding the process for picking the
president, noting: “The issue, one delegate to the Convention remarked, was ‘the most difficult of all
[that] we have had to decide’” (quoting RECORDS, supra note 1, at 501)).
18. In a humorous note, Mr. George Mason of Virginia, in opposition of cutting discussion on
a proposed article short, “Declar[ed] that he would sooner chop off his right hand than put it to the
Constitution as it [then stood].” See RECORDS, supra note 1, at 479.
19. The eleven individuals comprising the committee consisted of “Mr[.] Gilman, Mr. King[,]
Mr[.] Sherman[,] Mr. Brearley, Mr. Govr. Morris, Mr. Dickinson, Mr. Carrol, Mr. Madison,
Mr. Williamson, Mr. Butler[,] & Mr. Baldwin.” Id. at 481.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 493–501.
22. Id. at 493.
23. Id. at 499.
24. Id. at 498.
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them the vice-President.”25 Thereby, all power in deciding who would
serve as both president and vice president would ultimately rest not with the
Electoral College, but with the Senate.26 This would potentially vest the
Senate with de facto power in selecting the chief executive and his deputy,
and it is not difficult to see how this could easily be corrupted.27
Great discussion commenced between the likes of Mr. Madison, (who
later would be elected after a modification of this clause by the
Twelfth Amendment), Mr. Morris, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Pinkney, and
others.28 Specifically, James Madison—one of the Fathers of the
Constitution who would be integral to several historic events related to the
Constitution29—appeared apprehensive and worried the suggested plan
would provide the Senate with the power to decide, in the case of a lack of
majority for president and a tie for vice president, both of our Republic’s
highest officers.30
The debate continued with Mr. Morris noting six reasons why this form
of election was appropriate: (1) there “was the danger of intrigue [and]
faction” in allowing the Legislature to appoint electors; (2) this mode could
create an “inconveniency of an ineligibility” to “lessen its evils”;
(3) appointment by the Legislature would complicate the impeachment
25. Id.
26. The Author realizes until April 8, 1913, with the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment
states still selected senators, thus making senate selection of the president and vice president a de factor
secondary state election. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (removing the power of the states to select
senators and providing for the direct election of senators by the majority vote of the state’s population).
27. It is not beyond the pale of imagination to see a group of senators situated in our nation’s
capital, far away from their electorate and easily swayed by the influence of powerful men could lead
to a small, powerful cabal to influence the senators to vote for someone different than their state’s
desired. See RECORDS, supra note 1, at 499–501 (noting the corruption of the process by a cabal who
seeks to control every election); cf. ROBERT A. CARO, THE PATH TO POWER: THE YEARS OF LYNDON
JOHNSON I 46–47 (1982) (noting at the turn of the 20th century in the Texas Legislature a cabal of big
business and lobbyists used their money and “beefsteak, bourbon[,] and blondes” to influence poor
legislators in “one long orgy; in its backrooms [and] even on the floor of the Legislature” to receive
the lobbyists’ desired results).
28. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 499–501.
29. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (noting the Court’s opinion is considered
one of the foundations of United States constitutional law).
30. See RECORDS, supra note 1, at 500 (discussing Mr. Madison’s belief that this process of
allowing the Senate to decide amongst the five highest candidates for each office “would have the
effect at the same time, he observed, of giving the nomination of the candidates to the largest States”).
But see id. at 499 (noting Mr. Sherman did not object to the clause and believed “[t]he choice of the
President was to be made out of the five highest, obscure characters [that of which] were sufficiently
guarded against in that case: And he had no objection to requiring the vice-President to be chosen in
like manner, where the choice was not decided by a majority in the first instance”).
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process; (4) no one was thoroughly satisfied by the Legislature appointing
electors; (5) the people needed an immediate choice from the people; and
(6) allowing the Legislature to appoint electors would create an imbalance
in the separation of powers.31 Others, such as Mr. Pinkney, objected that
it would be improper to effectively allow the Senate de facto power to elect
the president, in addition to allowing it to act as “Judges in [the] case of an
impeachment.”32 Mr. Williamson’s objections rested chiefly upon this
current process, which made the president dependent on the Senate if he
desired reelection.33 In an attempt to salvage the plan, Mr. Wilson noted
that for the election of the president by one of the Houses, the House of
Representatives would be better than the Senate, as most prior
disagreements arose in part because the Senate would be the party electing
the President in the event of a tie.34 Shortly after this, it was moved to
postpone further consideration of this until another day.35 The following
day, September 5, 1787, the delegates continued their attempts to edit what
would be Clause 2 of Article II, yet little progress was made as most motions
to amend the language failed to pass.36 It appears that on September 6,
1787, progress began to take shape, and several parts of the clause we are
familiar with today started to pass.37 It is after this point the groundwork
for the current clause was nearly completed.
After the Convention, the Constitution was ratified and provided that
each state shall have electors tasked with casting ballots to elect the
president.38 The power to elect the president was given by the Constitution
to the States “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct . . . .”39

31. Id. at 500 (indicating Mr. Mason believed this plan “removed some capital objections,
particularly the danger of cabal and corruption. [However, it] was liable . . . that nineteen times in
twenty the President would be chosen by the Senate, [whom he opined] an improper body for the
purpose”).
32. Id. at 501.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 502.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 507.
37. Id. at 517–19.
38. See U.S. CONST art. II, § I, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint . . . a Number of Electors, equal
to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the
Congress . . . .”).
39. Id. (emphasis added).
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B. The Boundaries of This Comment
It is understandable that the issues surrounding the Electoral College and
the election of the President rouse strong and passionate responses—from
both those in support, and those in opposition—whether from partisan
beliefs or from historic events. However, this Comment does not seek to
address partisan aspects,40 and specific attention was taken during its
drafting to maintain a neutral balance, to use sources from both sides of the
discussion, and to not delve further into current political matters unless
absolutely necessary. The sole objective of this Comment is to provide an
understanding regarding where the Electoral College is today, and what
forces may be at work to influence it.
This Comment will not directly address many of the Electoral College
adjacent issues which arose during the early 21st century, specifically the
numerous attempts to decertify election results or to reject certified electors
from states over the past two decades.41 Further, although a novel and
interesting thought experiment, this Comment will not address any of the
potential powers of the vice president to overturn or reject the certified
electors of the several states.42 Neither will this Comment address the
issues encompassing President Donald J. Trump’s attempts to invalidate
election results, nor the events centering around the certification of the
election results on January 6, 2021.43 Lastly, the procedures of Congress to
40. In fact, it is the Author’s opinion that issues addressed regarding the Electoral College are
no more Republican versus Democrat as they are Federalist versus Democratic-Republicans. Instead,
the issue falls along the lines of whether one believes the power to select the president rests with a
majority of the states—as each is sovereign and the country exists with their consent to be joined—
or if one believes a small number of states with a larger population can dictate to the rest of the nation
who will be their leader.
41. Derek T. Muller, Democrats Have Been Shameless About Your Presidential Vote Too, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 06, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/opinion/democrat-republican-electoralvotes.html [https://perma.cc/3TBG-JGKB] (“[S]tarting with George W. Bush’s victory in the 2000
presidential election, Democrats contested election results after every Republican win.”).
42. See Kevin Breuninger, DOJ Opposes Republican Suit That Seeks to Have Pence Overturn Biden
Election in Trump’s Favor, CNBC (Dec. 31, 2020, 7:59 PM), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/
business/money-report/doj-opposes-republican-suit-that-seeks-to-have-pence-overturn-biden-electi
on-in-trumps-favor/2807470/?amp [https://perma.cc/SY24-Y3TY] (discussing the lawsuit by
Congressman Louie Gohmert to have Vice President Michael R. Pence reject the 2020 election results
during a Joint Session of Congress); see also Gohmert v. Pence, 510 F. Supp. 3d 435, 437 (E.D. Tex.),
aff’d, 862 F.App’x 349 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[Challenging] the constitutionality of the Electoral Count Act
of 1887 . . . .”).
43. See Alex Samuels & Patrick Svitek, After Riot at the U.S. Capitol, Ted Cruz Gets Fierce Blowback
for his Role in Sowing Doubts about Joe Biden’s Victory, TEXAS TRIBUNE (Jan. 07, 2021, 7:00 PM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2021/01/07/ted-cruz-riot-capitol/ [https://perma.cc/MYJ8-PEF4]
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object to election results will not specifically be addressed, as this Comment
is more directly related to the power the states have over electors.44
That being said, this Comment will analyze and address the principal issue
of how Chiafalo v. Washington will impact “faithless electors”45 and the
National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC) (or any similar plan for
effectively bypassing the Electoral College), and additionally, the issues
surrounding state control over the electors.46 Although the Supreme Court
did not take or have the opportunity to specifically address whether the
NPVIC or any form of interstate compact would be valid under the
Constitution, a plethora of commentary will assist in addressing this point.47
1.

A Brief Introduction to Chiafalo v. Washington

This Comment will specifically revolve around the impact of one case,
Chiafalo, thus, an introduction to that case is now necessary. The Chiafalo
case arose as a result of the 2016 presidential election, and directly dealt with
whether a state could fine a faithless elector for not voting for the
presidential candidate to which he or she was pledged to vote for as part of
being an elector.48 Further, the litigation revolving Chiafalo, as discussed

(discussing the events of January 6, 2021, and the attempt of senators to invalidate 2020 election
results).
44. See 3 U.S.C. § 15 (“Upon such reading . . . the President of the Senate shall call for
objections, if any. Every objection shall be made in writing . . . and shall be signed by at least one
Senator and one [Representative] before the same shall be received.”).
45. A “[f]aithless elector” is “a member of the Electoral College who does not vote for his or
her party’s nominee for president or vice president.” What Are Faithless Electors in the Electoral
College? (2020), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/What_are_faithless_electors_in_the_
Electoral_College%3F_(2020) [https://perma.cc/UT32-VTGK] (Jan. 13, 2021); see also Paul LeBlanc,
What Faithless Electors Are and Why They Won’t Matter This Year, CNN (Dec. 14, 2020, 6:39 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/13/politics/what-matters-december-13/index.html
[https://
perma.cc/98PB-J9JC] (“Historically, electors have overwhelmingly voted for the candidate who wins
the popular vote in their state[,] but they can stray. If they do, they’re called faithless electors.”).
46. See Thomas Jipping, The National Popular Vote: Misusing an Interstate Compact to Bypass the
Constitution, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.heritage.org/civilrights/report/the-national-popular-vote-misusing-interstate-compact-bypass-the-constitution [https:
//perma.cc/59KU-VNRQ] (highlighting the possibility that the National Popular Vote Interstate
Compact may violate the Constitution as an attempt to circumvent the amendment process).
47.
Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2319–22 (2020); see also Edward A. Hartnett, The
Pathological Perspective and Presidential Election, 73 SMU L. REV. 445, 461–66 (2020) (providing an in-depth
discussion of the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact and the interplay between the NPVIC
and the Compact Clause).
48. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2322–24.
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later, is the companion case of Baca v. Colorado Department of State.49
Although that case dealt with slightly different matters, Baca was reversed
through a memorandum opinion, which only cited the reasoning in Chiafalo
as
the
cause
for
reversing.50
In
Chiafalo,
The
Supreme Court of the United States ultimately affirmed the decision of the
Washington Supreme Court, which permitted the fine of the faithless
electors.51 Thus, this case provides an insight into the future of interpreting
the power state legislatures have over electors.52
II. THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE PROCESS
The public desire to abolish the Electoral College is not a novel
development of the last decade—people have been arguing against the
Electoral College from the beginning.53 Unsurprisingly, the calls to abolish
the Electoral College often come from the candidate who lost the previous
election.54 However, manipulation and attacks on the Electoral College are
not new, and began soon after the founding of the Republic.55 As a note
of the importance of the Electoral College, many of the most recent
49. Baca v. Colorado Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020)
(mem.) (per curiam).
50. See id. (detailing the matter in the 10th Circuit, which was ultimately reversed by the Supreme
Court); Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2316 (containing the reasoning ultimately used to reverse Baca).
51. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2329.
52. Id. at 2316.
53. See Jesse Wegman, Celebrating the Impact of Senator Birch Bayh: A Lasting Legacy on the Constitution
and Beyond, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 103, 104–07 (2020) (discussing the efforts of Senator Birch in the
1960s, attempting to replace the Electoral College with a direct popular vote).
54. See Dan Merica, Clinton: It’s Time to Abolish the Electoral College, CNN POLITICS
(Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/13/politics/hillary-clinton-anderson-cooperelectoral-college-cnntv/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZY2X-LUM4] (calling to abolish the Electoral
College after losing it to President Donald J. Trump); see also Rebecca Savransky, Al Gore: End the
Electoral College, THE HILL (Nov. 29, 2016, 5:24 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefingroom/news/307966-al-gore-says-he-supports-elimination-of-electoral-college
[https://perma.cc/B872-M8UV]
(discussing
the
one-time
presidential
hopeful,
Vice President Al Gore, who believed elimination of the Electoral College would improve voter
turnout). But see George Will, The President Who Knew Too Little About the Electoral College, NAT’L REV.
ONLINE (May 3, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/05/president-trumpelectoral-college-complaints-unfounded/
[https://perma.cc/YM3V-53ME]
(highlighting
President Trump’s calling for the direct election of the president, as it is easier to overcome than the
traditional Electoral College system. However, had this been in place in 2016, President Trump would
have lost the White House to Hillary Clinton.).
55. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 4, 1800) (James Madison Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (97) [Digital ID#s us0097, us0097_1]) (describing a plan to
manipulate the selection of electors in three states for the upcoming election).
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presidential elections have often rested on the Electoral College.56
However, the recent elections are not the only time periods in which the
Electoral College has played a pivotal role in selecting the President.57
Further, the election of President George W. Bush in 2000 stirred up a new
desire to end the Electoral College when he became President after winning
the requisite number of states to have enough electors to win the Electoral
College despite losing the overall national popular vote.58 This fire was
intensified by the 2016 election of President Donald J. Trump, and years
later these grievances have not waned—there is still a raging debate centered
around ending the Electoral College.59
Further, based on the current political climate, it seems that regardless of
the events surrounding the 2020 election outcome and the various elections
challenges and political matters encircling it,60 elections—especially close
and contentious elections—will cast the Electoral College into greater
debate.61 The Electoral College—the protector of the Republic from the
56. See FEDERAL ELECTIONS COMMISSION, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2000, ELECTION RESULTS
U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 11–12
(2001) (noting President George W. Bush received over 500,000 fewer votes than Al Gore in the
populace but received a majority of the Electoral College votes); FEDERAL ELECTIONS COMMISSION,
FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2016, ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE AND
THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 5–6 (2017) (noting President Donald J. Trump received
3,000,000 fewer votes than Hilary Clinton in the popular vote but received over seventy-seven more
Electoral College votes).
57. See Dave Roos, 5 Presidents Who Lost the Popular Vote but Won the Election, HIST.
(Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.history.com/news/presidents-electoral-college-popular-vote [https://
perma.cc/RF3F-XP28] (discussing five times where the Electoral College has been a center point in
the final decision of who would ultimately become the President of the United States).
58. See generally Ky Fullerton, Bush, Gore, and the 2000 Presidential Election: Time for the Electoral
College to Go?, 80 OR. L. REV. 717 (2001) (analyzing the 2000 Election, the Electoral College, and the
national popular vote).
59. See Steve Coll, The Case for Dumping the Electoral College, NEW YORKER (Sept. 13, 2020),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/09/21/the-case-for-dumping-the-electoral-college
[https://perma.cc/DSV7-JN5Q] (criticizing the Electoral College by characterizing it as broken, and
opining President Trump’s win was inevitable, even if he were to lose the popular vote, as the President
likely wins the Electoral College).
60. See Michael Lee, House Democrats Introduce Constitutional Amendment to Ban Electoral College,
MSN (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/house-democrats-introduceconstitutional-amendment-to-ban-electoral-college/ar-BB1cIRc7 [https://perma.cc/A88P-5DVU]
(noting a proposed amendment to the Constitution over the events surrounding the 2020 election).
61. See Tim Alberta, Blowout for Biden or Narrow Win for Trump?, POLITICO (Sept. 8, 2020
4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/09/08/smoke-filled-zoom-conventionedition-243505 [https://perma.cc/YYY7-HBTR] (discussing the opinions of four former Republican
presidential candidates’ staffers that then 2020 Presidential Candidate Biden will win the popular vote
in a landslide but noting former President Trump’s likelihood of winning through the Electoral
FOR THE
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tyranny of the majority—is facing ever mounting calls for abolishment.62
For example, at least one Joint Resolution was submitted in an attempt to
abolish the Electoral College during the 116th Congress, but the resolution
did not move further than the introductory stage.63 However, it reappeared
in the 117th Congress.64
A. States Select the President Through a Process Outlined in the 12th Amendment
As introduced in Part I65 of this Comment, the path to deciding how to
elect the president was not without difficulty. Thus, it comes as no surprise
that the direct election of a president failed numerous times during the
Constitutional Convention.66 Although much thought was placed upon the
selection of the president, the system quickly became one of the most visible
areas of the Constitution that needed refinement. This was particularly
apparent after the results of two contentious elections, which challenged the
structure of the original process of electing the president outlined in the
Constitution.67 Two consecutive difficult elections demonstrated that the
original Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution had a flaw, which resulted
in the House of Representatives selecting the president when a tie resulted
between all of the candidates in the Electoral College, as the votes were

College). Further, as noted, this Comment will not touch on the issues truly regarding the
2020 Presidential Election. See Kevin Breuninger, supra note 42 (discussing one of the issues faced
after the 2020 Presidential Election).
62. See Spenser Mestel, Why The Electoral College Is More Relevant Today Than Ever, HUFFPOST
(Nov. 30, 2016 1:09 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/why-the-electoral-college-is-morerelevant-today-than_b_583f08a7e4b048862d73fd70 [https://perma.cc/ZCD6-E6VA] (opining on the
desire to abolish the Electoral College).
63. See H.R.J. Res. 7, 116th Cong. (2019) (attempting to amend the Constitution by abolishing
the Electoral College).
64. See H.R.J. Res. 14, 117th Cong. (2021) (proposing a constitutional amendment by abolishing
the Electoral College in favor of directly electing the President through a national popular vote); see also
Lee, supra note 60 (detailing the reasons for the Members of Congress putting forward H.R.J. Res. 14
in the 117th Congress).
65. See supra Section I(A).
66. See Jim King, Presidential Selection the Electoral College v. Direct Election, 34 WYO. LAW. 26, 28
(2011) (“Despite the advocacy of such influential delegates as Morris and James Madison, the
Convention twice voted down proposals for direct election of the President.”).
67. See Tally of Electoral Votes for the 1800 Presidential Election, NAT’L ARCHIVES,
https://www.archives.gov/legislative/features/1800-election/1800-election.html
[https://perma.
cc/HZ6L-YPSW] [hereinafter Tally of Electoral Votes] (discussing the identification of unforeseen issues
within the electoral system which ultimately led to the passage of the Twelfth Amendment).
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taken for all names regardless if one was a candidate for vice president or
president.68
The original text of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution did not
provide, as the Twelfth Amendment does, two separate votes—one for
president and one for vice president. Instead, when the Electoral College
was evenly split, the House of Representatives became the final and only
body to choose the president.69 With the House of Representatives having
the final vote, such a process led to tremendous levels of confusion and
unintended consequences, as two candidates from opposing parties were
essentially being thrown into the offices of president and vice president.70
The trouble with both the election of 179671 (when Federalist John
Adams was forced to have Republican Thomas Jefferson as his vice
president) and of 180072 (where the House of Representatives cast thirtyfive ballots to determine the president after a tied Electoral College) was
rectified when Congress passed the Twelfth Amendment.73 The Twelfth
Amendment provides that:
The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for
President and Vice-President . . . and they shall make distinct lists of all
persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President,
and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify,
and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States . . . .
The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the
68. See id. (emphasizing the problems which came to fruition following the election of 1800,
including the dozens of votes cast by the House of Representatives during two contested elections).
69. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII (describing the process by
which the President would be chosen and for the fallback procedure should the Electoral College be
split evenly); see also id. (amending the issue of a split between the Electoral College to provide for two
separate ballots as well a better procedure for a split of the Electoral College).
70. See Tally of Electoral Votes, supra note 67 (“The framers of the Constitution had not anticipated
such a tie nor had they considered the possibility of the election of a President or Vice President from
opposing factions[—]which had been the case in the 1796 election.”).
71. In this election, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson—although belonging to different
parties—finished first and second respectively, meaning that the president and vice president would
be of opposing parties. See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 465–66 (Simon & Schuster 2001)
(noting James Madison was worried that Jefferson would have to serve under Adams, yet Jefferson
relented (and likely resented) that “[Adams] has always been my senior, from the commencement of
my public life”).
72. Historian David McCullough raises the important point making the Election of 1800 even
more contentious, this was “the first (and last) time in history, the President was running against the
Vice President.” Id. at 537.
73. See Tally of Electoral Votes supra note 67 (discussing the background issues that led to the
passage of the Twelfth Amendment).
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President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors
appointed; and if no person has such majority, then from the persons having
the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as
President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot,
the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states,
the representation from each state having one vote . . . .74

After the passage of the Twelfth Amendment, this process outlines the
modern process of electing the president, which we are familiar with
today.75
B. Steps of Selecting Electors
The present process of appointing the electors is still, for the most part,
robustly defined by state law, but there are certain mandates found in federal
law (even though the electors are selected by processes in the several
states).76
1. General Federal Law Applying to the Electoral College Under
Title 3 of the United States Code
Although state laws apply, there are certain provisions in Title 3 of the
United States Code that apply to the selection of electors.77 For instance,
by statute, electors are appointed on the date of the Presidential Election.78
In addition, after Tuesday, November 3, 2020, electors from each state were

74. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
75. See generally Presidential Election Process, USAGOV, https://www.usa.gov/election
[https://perma.cc/H477-GJ7M] (Jan. 14, 2021) (outlining the process for electing the President);
Electoral College History, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/electoral-college/
history#whyec [https://perma.cc/4JJ9-P3FY] (noting answers to the general process of the Electoral
College and its modern-day functions).
76. See Sarah Pruitt, How Are Electoral College Electors Chosen?, HIST. (Dec. 14, 2020),
https://www.history.com/news/electors-chosen-electoral-college [https://perma.cc/9LAT-QWN9]
(“[M]ost [state’s] method of choosing electors is by state party convention. Each political party’s state
convention nominates a slate of electors, and a vote is held at the convention. In a smaller number of
states, electors are chosen by a vote of the state party’s central committee.”).
77. See generally 3 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (regarding the federal provisions under Title 3 governing the
Electoral College).
78. See id. (“The electors of President and Vice President shall be appointed, in each State, on
the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November, in every fourth year succeeding every election
of a President and Vice President.”).
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selected according to each state’s law in accordance with the mandates of
Article II of the Constitution.79
If a state fails to select their electors “on the Tuesday next after the first
Monday in November,”80 then the state shall soon thereafter appoint
electors pursuant to each state’s specific laws.81 Regardless of the
certification date per the states, either on election day or after, Congress has
established the hard deadline for the electors to vote for the president and
vice president to be “on the first Monday after the second Wednesday in
December next following their appointment . . . .”82
2.

Outlining the Selection of Electors

Although there are federal laws detailing procedural aspects of the
electors,83 the present model for the selection of electors is a wholly political
process.84 Unsurprisingly, the electors themselves are unelected figures85
and are chosen well in advance of the November election by members of
the several political parties in the various states.86 Aside from giving the
power to select electors to the several states, the only apparent restraints in
79. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each state shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors . . . .”); see also TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN § 192.003 (“[A] person
must be nominated as a political party’s elector candidate in accordance with party rules or named as
an elector candidate by an independent or write-in candidate for president.”); Michael S. Rosenwald,
Biden, Once One of the Nation’s Youngest Senators, Will Be Its Oldest President,
WASH.
POST
(Jan. 11,
2021,
6:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/
history/2021/01/11/youngest-senators-joe-biden/
[https://perma.cc/HMC6-8Z8U]
(noting
Joseph R. Biden, Jr. will be the 46th President of the United States of America).
80. 3 U.S.C. § 1.
81. See id. § 2 (“Whenever any State has held an election for the purpose of choosing electors,
and has failed to make a choice on the day prescribed by law, the electors may be appointed on a
subsequent day in such a manner as the legislature of such State may direct.”).
82. See id. § 7 (providing the date on which the electors will meet and cast their vote for
President and Vice President); see also TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 192.006(a) (instructing electors to
meet “at the State Capitol at 2 p.m. on the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December”
following the Presidential election).
83. See 3 U.S.C. § 1 (stating federal laws and procedures surrounding electors).
84. See Scott Bomboy, Who Are the Electors in the Electoral College?, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Oct. 21,
2016),
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/who-are-the-electors-in-the-electoral-college
[https://perma.cc/XE9U-6HQN] (detailing the process by which states select slates of electors).
85. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“[N]o Senator or Representative, or Person holding an
[O]ffice of [T]rust or [P]rofit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.”).
86. See Bomboy, supra note 84 (“The list of the electors, or the slate of electors, within a state
usually doesn’t appear on the election ballot . . . . Each political party decides how to submit its slate
of electors, at the request of its presidential candidate.”); cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 8
(noting that the selection of the president would be “not to any preestablished body, but to men chosen
by the people for the special purpose . . . .”).
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the Constitution for the selection of electors are the Fourteenth
Amendment’s prohibition that “[n]o person shall be a[n] . . . elector of
President and Vice President . . . [if they] have engaged in insurrection or
rebellion against the [Constitution of the United States], or given aid or
comfort to the enemies thereof[,]”87 and Article II’s requirement that “no
Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit
under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.”88 The final
guidepost established in the Constitution for the selection of electors is that
no means of selection of electors is permitted to violate any other clause or
article of the Constitution: essentially, even though there are limited
restraints outlined in Article II and the Twelfth Amendment, electors may
not be appointed if their appointment would violate any other part of the
Constitution or laws of the United States.89
3. A Citizen’s Power to Elect an Elector Does Not Exist Unless the
State Grants This Right
One surprising note regarding a citizens power to elect an elector comes
from the 2000 case, Bush v. Gore.90 In Bush, the Court noted that a person
does not have a general right to vote for their electors “until the state
legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power to
appoint members of the Electoral College.”91 To that point, this
requirement that the state must confer this right seems in line with what the
Court has previously stated in the nineteenth century case of McPherson v.
Blacker,92 where the Court noted that the Constitution provides the states
with plenary power over how to choose electors.93

87. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3; see Pruitt, supra note 76 (highlighting some of the steps in
modern process of selecting the members of the Electoral College).
88. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
89. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968) (stating, “[T]hese granted powers are always
subject to the limitation that they may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions
of the Constitution”).
90. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
91. Id. at 104 (emphasis added) (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1).
92. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
93. See id. at 35 (“[F]rom the formation of the government until now the practical construction
of [Article II, Section 1] has conceded plenary power to the state legislatures in the matter of the
appointment of electors.”).
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C. Power over Electors Pre-Chiafalo
The Constitution, as mentioned above, communicates few demands on
how an elector may be chosen.94 Further, the power to select electors is
vested with the several state legislatures to decide how to select the
electors.95 Since the founding of the Republic, the Supreme Court has
spoken only a few times about the power over electors.96 The ground zero
principle, which Justice Kagan spoke of early in Chiafalo, states that nearly
all states will bind electors of either party to vote for that party’s nominee if
such nominee wins the election of that state.97 Further, the Court once
before upheld this binding of parties by denying that being an elector
“demands absolute freedom for the elector to vote his own choice . . . .”98
In Ray v. Blair,99 the Court faced an individual from Alabama alleging that
the state’s law requiring him to vote for the winner of the state’s general
election violated his constitutional rights as an elector.100 Specifically, he
argued the “intention of the Founders was that [presidential] electors should
exercise their judgment in voting[,]” and requiring him to pledge his vote
“interfere[d] with the performance of this constitutional duty to select [a
president] according to the best judgment of the elector.”101 The Court in
Ray noted that often electors’ votes did not matter, and, in fact, the electors
were supposed to act as conduits for the will of the parties.102 Thus, the
Court upheld the Alabama law in Ray, as nothing in the Twelfth
Amendment barred “a political party from requiring the pledge to support
the nominees of the National Convention.”103 As Justice Kagan noted,

94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.
95. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such [M]anner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a [N]umber of [E]lectors . . . .”).
96. See generally McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892) (discussing the Electoral College, and
some of the early powers over it recognized by the Supreme Court); Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952)
(discussing some limits on the power over electors).
97. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2319 (2020) (“Most States also compel electors
to pledge in advance to support the nominee of that party.”).
98. Ray, 343 U.S. at 228.
99. Ray v. Blair, 343 U. S. 214 (1952).
100. Id. at 225.
101. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2323 (quoting Ray, 343 U.S. at 225) (alteration in original).
102. See id. at 2323 (“To the contrary, ‘[h]istory teaches that the electors were expected to
support the party nominees’ as far back as the earliest contested presidential elections.”) (quoting Ray,
343 U.S. at 228 (alteration in original)).
103. Ray, 343 U.S. at 231.
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today at least fifteen states have enacted laws that provide for sanctions if
electors are faithless.104
As the Court reaffirmed in Chiafalo, a state does not have to give unlimited
freedom to an elector in his or her choosing of the president.105 For
example, a state may require an elector to sign a pledge requiring them to
vote for a certain candidate, and states do not have to give the electors
unlimited freedom in making their decision.106 However, one thing is clear,
“the power to select electors [cannot] be exercised in such a way as to violate
express constitutional commands . . . .”107
1.

How States Divide Their Electors

Each state has the power to appoint electors based on the decisions of
the people through the various state legislatures.108 Today, all but two
states give the winner of the state’s popular vote all of their electoral college
votes.109
The two states—Maine and Nebraska—that do not give all of their
electors to the candidate who wins the overall popular vote,110 instead give
two electors at large for the winner of the state’s popular vote, and then give

104. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2322 n.2 (listing the specific statutes from fifteen states providing for
sanctions of faithless electors).
105. See id. at 2320 (reaffirming the reasoning in Ray, 343 U.S. 214).
106. See id. (“This Court upheld such a pledge requirement decades ago, rejecting the argument
that the Constitution ‘demands absolute freedom for the elector to vote his own choice.’”) (quoting
Ray, 343 U.S. at 228).
107. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968) (discussing the application of the Equal
Protection Clause related to the selection of presidential electors for political parties at the state level).
108. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a [N]umber of [E]lectors . . . .”); see also Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2324
(“This Court has described that clause as ‘conveying the broadest power of determination’ over who
becomes an elector.”) (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892)). The question this
Comment does not address, is one created by Justice Thomas’ assertion that Article II, Section 1
provides no delegation of power, just a duty for the states to fulfill. See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2329
(Thomas, J. concurring in the judgment) (“This obligation to provide the manner of appointing electors
does not expressly delegate power to States; it simply imposes an affirmative duty.”) (citing U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thorton, 514 U.S. 779, 862–63 (1995) (Thomas, J. dissenting)).
109. See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2321 n.1 (“[In] Maine and Nebraska . . . two electors go to the
winner of the statewide vote and one goes to the winner of each congressional district.”); How Are
Electors Chosen?, TAEGAN GORDON’S ELECTORAL VOTE MAP, https://electoralvotemap.com/howare-electors-chosen/ [https://perma.cc/J9EZ-NLGV] (discussing the various methods that states
appoint electors and providing links to state statutes governing electors).
110. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21-A, § 802 (providing, “[o]ne presidential elector shall be chosen
from each congressional district and [two] at large”).
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one elector the winner of the popular vote in each congressional district.111
The process adopted by both Maine and Nebraska allows for the interesting
aspect where the total winner of the overall votes may be one candidate who
collects the most votes statewide, and then each of the congressional
districts will give their elector to a candidate who, though did not win the
overall vote, won the majority of that district.112
III. CHIAFALO V. WASHINGTON CHANGED THE LANDSCAPE
OF FAITHLESS ELECTOR LAWS
The narrow question presented for the Court to consider in Chiafalo
boiled down to “whether a State may [in addition to binding electors to a
promise] penalize an elector for breaking his pledge and voting for someone
other than the presidential candidate who won his State’s popular vote.”113
The Court answered this question in the affirmative; states may (1) bind
electors to promises to vote for a specific candidate; and (2) punish an
elector—by removal, fine, or otherwise—should they not vote in
accordance with that promise.114
A. Background of Chiafalo v. Washington and Colorado Department of
State v. Baca
Two cases stand out as what could be considered the start of a major reevaluation for the potential future for how states control their electors, and
the future of faithless electors.115 First, a brief background on each case.

111. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-710 (providing, “[o]ne presidential elector shall be chosen from
each congressional district, and two presidential electors shall be chosen at large”).
112. See Split Electoral Votes in Maine and Nebraska, 270 TO WIN, https://www.
270towin.com/content/split-electoral-votes-maine-and-nebraska/ [https://perma.cc/NH2Y-4CBE]
(discussing the possibility of “multiple popular vote contests in these states . . . .”); Maine Results,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/maine
[https://perma.cc/4ES6-LBLA] (detailing Donald Trump receiving one electoral vote in Maine while
Hillary Clinton received three electoral votes).
113. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2320.
114. See id. at 2320 (“We hold that a State may [penalize faithless electors].”); see also Ray v. Blair,
343 U. S. 214, 228 (1952) (noting that electors may be bound to vote in a particular way and do not
have unlimited freedom to choose for whom they cast their vote).
115. See generally Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. 2316; Colo. Dep’t of State v. Baca, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020)
(mem.) (per curiam).
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The Background of Colorado Department of State v. Baca

Colorado Department of State v. Baca116 originated after the 2016 election
where Mr. Baca, as a presidential elector in Colorado, was removed for
casting a vote for John Kasich instead of Hillary Clinton.117 The Colorado
Secretary of State removed Mr. Baca from office as an elector, discarded his
vote, and replaced him with an elector who would vote for
Hillary Clinton.118
The parties brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in a federal district court in
Colorado against the Colorado Department of State for the removal of
Mr. Baca and the feared removal of two other Electors.119 The district
court granted the Department of State’s motion to dismiss, but the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, determining that the nullification and
removal of Mr. Baca as elector was unconstitutional and violated his rights
as an elector.120
2.

The Background of Chiafalo v. Washington

The leading case that the Supreme Court employed to decide the overall
matter of a state’s power to punish an elector is that of Chiafalo v.
Washington.121 Similar to the facts in Baca, Chiafalo v. Washington also stems
from the 2016 election. There, two more presidential electors for the State
of Washington, who were selected to vote for Hillary Clinton as president,
voted instead for a different candidate, thus becoming faithless electors
subject to their states own applicable laws regarding the punishment of
faithless electors.122
However, unlike in Baca, the votes were counted and transmitted to
Washington D.C.123 After the ballots were counted, the Washington
116. Colo. Dep’t of State v. Baca, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020) (mem.) (per curiam).
117. See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 901–02 (10th Cir. 2019) (providing
background information on the origins of the case), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020) (mem.) (per curiam).
118. Baca, 935 F.3d at 901–02.
119. See id. (discussing the basis of the suit where “Micheal Baca, Polly Baca, and Robert
Nemanich . . . were appointed as three of Colorado’s nine presidential electors for the 2016 general
election”). Mr. Baca was removed as a presidential elector by the Colorado Secretary of State and Mr.
Baca and Mr. Nemanich feared their removal on similar grounds. Id.
120. Id.
121. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020).
122. See In re Guerra, 441 P.3d 807, 807–08 (Wash. 2019) (providing background details on the
case which later became Chiafalo v. Washington).
123. See id. (discussing pertinent facts of Chiafalo); cf. Baca, 935 F.3d at 904 (noting that the votes
cast by the Electors in Baca were not transmitted to Washington, D.C., because the Electors from
Colorado were removed from office instead of fined).
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Secretary of State fined the faithless electors under the applicable
Washington law.124 The parties then appealed their fine to an
administrative law judge (ALJ), where, following an unfavorable decision
due to the jurisdiction of the ALJ, the parties entered state district court.125
The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the trial court’s decision to
allow the fine, and rested its analysis, inter alia, on the grounds that
“Article II, [S]ection 1 of the United States Constitution grants to the states
plenary power to direct the manner and mode of appointment of electors
to the Electoral College.”126
In the State of Washington, if an elector did not vote the way that they
were required and pledged to do based on the political party the electors
were selected by, then the original punishment was a $1,000 fine.127
However, now the fine has been changed and the elector is removed from
office as punishment.128 The original punishment in Washington is
different than that described in Baca, which solely appeared to be the
removal of a presidential elector, and the replacement of him with an elector
who would vote as instructed.129
The Supreme Court of the United States took up the matter of Chiafalo
and Baca, and the cases were granted certiorari130 to the Supreme Court of
Washington and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, respectively.131
Because Baca was determined exclusively by the rationale used in Chiafalo,
this Comment will neither directly discuss nor analyze the Baca rationale, as
it is the same as in Chiafalo but with slightly different facts.132
3.

A Note on Baca’s Punishment and the Present Law of the State of

124. See Guerra, 441 P.3d at 808; WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.56.340 (2016) (issuing $1,000 fine
on faithless electors).
125. See Guerra, 441 P.3d at 809 (describing the procedural history of the events leading to
Chiafalo).
126. Id. at 817 (holding the fine did not violate the Constitution of the United States).
127. See WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.56.340 (2016) (issuing $1,000 find on faithless electors).
128. See id. at § 29A.56.090(3) (2019) (removing faithless electors).
129. See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 901 (2019), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020)
(mem.) (per curiam) (describing the removal of Mr. Baca for not casting his vote for Hillary Clinton).
130. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 918 (2020) (mem.) (granting certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Washington and to the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit and
consolidating cases).
131. Colo. Dep’t of State v. Baca, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020) (mem.) (per curiam).
132. See id. (“The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is
reversed for the reasons stated in Chiafalo v. Washington . . . .”).
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Washington Regarding Faithless Electors
Surprisingly, in an attempt to differentiate between Chiafalo and Baca, it is
interesting to note that a state also has the power to remove an elector for
failing to uphold the oath to vote for the correct candidate.133 Further, this
Comment will analyze generally Justice Kagan’s rationale as it is applied to
Baca’s reversal by the Supreme Court, which tends to indicate that a
presidential elector can be subjected to punishment—whether removal or a
fine—for failing to comply with the election laws of the state for which they
are electors.134
It is interesting to note that, presently, the punishment for acting as a
faithless elector in Washington now matches the punishment in Baca, and
not the fine mentioned in Chiafalo.135
B. Analysis of Chiafalo, and What it Means for Faithless Electors
1.

The Historical Analysis Found in Chiafalo

Justice Kagan begins her opinion in Chiafalo by discussing the history of
the development of our Electoral College system from the Constitutional
Convention period, noting the events causing the development of the
Twelfth Amendment,136 and further developments to elector laws over the
course of the country’s history.137 Highlighting this development, the
Court identified, all but one state of the Republic, by 1832, had arrived at a
system whereby there was a popular election of the president in each state,
and such was used to apportion electors to the appropriate candidate.138
Then detailing states during the early twentieth century, the Court
observed that states began “enact[ing] statutes meant to guarantee that

133. See generally, Baca, 935 F.3d at 901.
134. See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2328 (“Among the devices States have long used to achieve their
object are pledge laws, designed to impress on electors their role as agents of others. A State follows
in the same tradition if, like Washington, it chooses to sanction an elector for breaching his promise.”)
135. See Baca, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020); Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2322; see also WASH. REV. CODE
§ 29A.56.090(3) (2019) (removing faithless electors, the punishment presently in place); cf.
id. § 29A.56.340 (2016) (issuing the $1,000 fine in place during Chiafolo).
136. Humorously, Justice Kagan makes the following analogy to one of the causes of the
Twelfth Amendment, implemented after the 1796 election, where “John Adams came in first among
the candidates, and Thomas Jefferson second. That meant the leaders of the era’s two warring political
parties . . . became President and Vice President respectively. (One might think of this as fodder for a
new season of Veep.)” Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2320–21.
137. See id. at 2321–22.
138. See id. at 2321.
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outcome—that is, to prohibit so-called faithless voting. Rather than just
assume that party-picked electors would vote for their party’s winning
nominee, those States insist that they do so.”139 Shortly after these
“faithless elector” laws were put into place, a large number of states began
to enact legislation providing for fines for those electors who violate a
pledge to vote for a specific candidate.140 With this framework in place,
the Court then moves into the true implications of Chiafalo.141
2.

A Discussion of Caselaw Supporting the Chiafalo Decision

The Court began its analysis by looking to the Court’s prior case, Ray v.
Blair, and notes how that case failed to address the question of: “Could a
State enforce those pledges through legal sanctions?”142 Then turning to
the Constitution and prior precedent, the Court states that “each State may
appoint electors ‘in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct[,]’”143 and, further, that the mandate by the Founders in Article II,
“‘convey[s] the broadest power of determination’ over who becomes an
elector.”144
Justice Kagan calls attention to one critical argument regarding the
presidential electors by stating that “nothing in the Constitution expressly
prohibits States from taking away presidential electors’ voting discretion as
Washington does.”145 When considering whether there is historical
precedent for faithless electors to be allowed, the opinion suggests that
during the course of the history of our Republic, from time-to-time, there
have been occasions where electors were faithless.146 However, with

139. See id. (emphasis added) (stating that “As of [July 2020], 32 States and the District of
Columbia have such statutes on their books”).
140. See id. at 2322 (describing state sanctions, including Washington’s).
141. See id. at 2323–24 (stating the question of whether a state may enforce elector pledges
through sanctions was unanswered by the Court and would now be answered).
142. See id. at 2323 (signaling to Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 230 (1952) and noting that the
conclusion of the case did not address whether an elector may be fined for failure to uphold a voting
pledge).
143. Id. at 2324 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.).
144. Id. at 2324 (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892)). “Article II, § 1
[provides] an ‘express delegation[ ] of power to the States.’” Id. at n.5 (quoting U. S. Term Limits, Inc.
v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 805 (1995)) (alteration in original); see also Keith E. Whittington, The Vexing
Problem of Faithless Electors, CATO S. CT. REV., 2019–2020, at 87 (discussing the Court’s connection to
McPherson and how it relates to the reasoning in Chiafalo).
145. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2324.
146. See id. at 2326–28 (mentioning some periods of faithless electors in the history of the
Republic).
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history exposing only one time when a faithless elector’s vote counted after
it was challenged, Justice Kagan concludes that “[t]he Electors’
constitutional claim has neither text nor history on its side.”147 Finally,
Justice Kagan deduces that states have a right to sanction and punish
electors for failing to keep the pledges required by state law because
“[faithless electors] have no ground for reversing the vote of millions of its
citizens. That direction accords with the Constitution—as well as with the
trust of a Nation that here, We the People rule.”148 Thus, the mandate of
the Court that “We the People rule”149 may be the true key for allowing the
National Popular Vote Interstate Compact to come to fruition.
3. It Is Unclear What Happens if There Is a Death of a Candidate
Post-Election But Prior to the Electoral College Certifying the Election
As a strange, but novel aside to the overall discussion—which may one
day be a pressing and present issue, but here is not addressed—is a
complaint from the petitioners in Chiafalo, about what happens when a
candidate dies between Election day and the date the Electoral College
meets to vote.150 This concern is raised in the last footnote, at the close of
the majority opinion in Chiafalo, where Justice Kagan addresses a complaint
from the Petitioners in Chiafalo about what happens when a candidate dies
between Election day and the date the Electoral College meets to vote.151
Justice Kagan—while reminding that the question is not before the Court
and thus not considered—left open the possibility of compelling an Elector
to vote for a deceased candidate.152

147. See id. at 2328 (concluding after discussing the electors attempt to dictate that history is a
constitutional reason for permitting faithless electors “the Electors cannot rest a claim of historical
tradition on one counted vote in over 200 years”).
148. Id. at 2328; see Whittington, supra note 144, at 92 (“[T]he Court was clear that rogue electors
are inherently anti-democratic and at odds with the spirit of American constitutional democracy.”).
149. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2328.
150. Id. at n.8
151. See id. (addressing the concerns of a post-election, but pre-Electoral College balloting
death).
152. See id. (noting that if a candidate died prior to when the Electoral College meets, “[W]e
suspect . . . States without a specific provision would also release electors from their pledge . . . .
[B]ecause the situation is not before us, nothing in this opinion should be taken to permit the States to
bind electors to a deceased candidate”).
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IV. THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE INTERSTATE COMPACT
Although there may be other instances in the history of our Republic
where individuals or groups have sought to circumvent the Electoral
College, the most pressing danger to this is the growing trend of a national
popular vote interstate compact. It would seem that, should this be
permitted to be enacted, Mr. Mason’s fears of a cabal controlling and
dictating the outcome could come to fruition.153
A. History of the Compact
The National Popular Vote in its present state dates back to at least 2001,
directly after the 2000 Presidential Election and Bush v. Gore.154 Current
commentators view the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact as a tool
to allow for the direct election of the president and vice president without
going through the traditional amendment process.155 As discussed, a
candidate must receive 270 votes in the Electoral College to win the
presidency.156 However, by the breakdown of electoral votes per state, a
person can win the requisite number of electoral votes without winning a
majority of the overall national vote, thus allowing a person to become

153. See RECORDS, supra note 1, at 500 (noting Mr. Mason believed that the Electoral College
“removed some capital objections, particularly the danger of cabal and corruption”). Should the
NPVIC be allowed to be enacted, it could, and this Author believes will, lead to a cabal of states who
are small in number but large in population dictating to the other sovereign states who will be their
leader.
154. See Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, How to Achieve Direct National Election of the
President Without Amending the Constitution: Part Three of A Three-part Series on The 2000 Election and The
Electoral College, FINDLAW (Dec. 28, 2001), https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/how-toachieve-direct-national-election-of-the-president-without-amending-the-constitution.html
[https://perma.cc/TU
9Z-9J4C] (describing the path to direct election of the President); Agreement Among the States to Elect the
President by National Popular Vote, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE INC., https://www.national
popularvote.com/written-explanation [https://perma.cc/RZX6-9DET] [herein after Agreement Among
the States) (explaining the history of the National Popular Vote and the states that have subscribed).
155. See
The
National
Popular
Vote
Interstate
Compact,
PROJECT VOTE,
http://www.projectvote.org/issues/voting-policy/national-popular-vote-interstate-compact/ [https:
//perma.cc/CPJ6-GPBM] (describing the idea for a national popular vote as a way to get around an
impossible amendment process and mentioning the fact that a majority of the votes cast have twice
gone to the losing candidate because of the Electoral College vote).
156. See Pruitt, supra note 76 (“There are 538 total electors, including one for each U.S. senator
and representative and three electors representing the District of Columbia, and presidential candidates
need a majority of 270 votes to win the White House.”).
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president without winning the overall national popular vote, but merely
winning a majority of the Electoral College vote.157
With this strategy of only needing to win a majority of the electors in
mind, an early leader and founder of the nonprofit currently leading the
efforts for the NPVIC, is attempting to move on a state-by-state basis to
have states pledge their electors to vote for the candidate who receives the
overall national popular vote victory.158 While presently, the National
Popular Vote appears to have been wholeheartedly welcomed in mainly
Democrat controlled states, the proponents of the NPVIC further insist that
the compact should not be a partisan Issue and that the overall goals of the
National Popular Vote are focused on bipartisan goals of creating a stronger
and more engaged electoral system.159
B. The Overall Goal of the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact
The overall goal of the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact is to
“guarantee the Presidency to the candidate who receives the most popular
votes across all 50 states and the District of Columbia.”160 However, this
national popular vote is truly nothing more than an end-run around the
Constitutional requirement of the Electoral College.161 Although it is not
part of the analysis of this Comment nor discussed in Chiafalo, if the NPVIC
were to reach the threshold of 270 electors pledged to it, it would most likely
encourage and drive a constitutional amendment to permit, alter, or

157. Roos, supra note 57 (“Of the 58 presidential elections in the history of the United States,
53 of the winners took both the Electoral College and the popular vote.
But in
five . . . elections . . . the winner of the Electoral College was in fact the loser of the popular vote.”).
158. See Elliot Ramos, There’s a Plan Afoot to Replace the Electoral College, and Your State May Already
Be a Part of It, NBC NEWS (Nov. 10, 2020, 9:07 A.M.), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020election/map-national-popular-vote-plan-replace-electoral-college-n1247159 [https://perma.cc/D7
ZZ-Y54J] (noting opinions from John Koza regarding his motivation for the NPVIC).
159. See id. (highlighting the NPVIC has support of former Republican National Committee
members, and that the purpose is to have candidates focus on the entire country, not just swing states).
160. Agreement Among the States, supra note 154. But see Jipping, supra note 46 (discussing how the
National Popular Vote violates the limited ways states may make interstate compacts).
161. See Hans von Spakovsky, Destroying the Electoral College: The Anti-Federalist National Popular
Vote Scheme, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.heritage.org/electionintegrity/report/destroying-the-electoral-college-the-anti-federalist-national-popular-0
[https://
perma.cc/CXY6-U326] (detailing how the NPV will destroy federalism); Brian C. Kalt, Unconstitutional
but Entrenched Putting Uocava and Voting Rights for Permanent Expatriates on A Sound Constitutional Footing,
81 BROOK. L. REV. 441, 514 (2016) (mentioning the novel idea of the NPV as a way to eliminate the
electoral college without amending the Constitution).
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eliminate the NPVIC, if it is not struct down by the Court.162 A peculiar
consideration would be if a super majority of states, more than 3/4th of the
states, enacted the NPVIC—or for that matter any binding law together that
would, in effect, alter the Constitution—and if this would be a de facto
convention of states under Article V. An important aside is that the Court’s
taking up and deciding Chiafalo is a strong indication that the Court will not
view Electoral College questions as nonjusticiable political questions.
However, in addition to that, proponents of the NPVIC purport to have
more democratic ideas related to the compact, including the ability to
increase voter turnout by forcing candidates to have to focus more on nonswing states.163 Further, the move to the NPVIC may provide for greater
ballot security, as under the current system there is the ability for one to
possibly alter and tamper with ballots in several swing states to change the
course of the election because smaller numbers of votes can alter the overall
number of electors received.164
Additionally, proponents of the NPVIC state that the compact would
provide the millions of voters in states where their selected candidate is not
the winner of that state’s popular vote but the winner of the overall national
popular vote with the ability to vindicate their vote by permitting it to count
as their selected candidate won the overall national popular vote.165 This
would essentially mean that the caster of a blue vote in a red state and a red
vote in a blue state would still count the same, regardless of which party
won the state, if their party’s candidate won the national popular vote.166

162. Kalt, supra note 161 (opining that if there were truly an NPV that it would likely be altered
or amended by Congress).
163. See Patrick Rosensteil & Scott Drexel, National Popular Vote: Bipartisan Reform to Presidential
Elections, REAL CLEAR POL. (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2020/01/
15/national_popular_vote_bipartisan_reform_to_presidential_elections_142147.html#!
[https://
perma.cc/QQ7Q-HYLX] (highlighting data showing higher voter turnout in swing states versus the
turnout in non-swing states).
164. See Id. (noting how in a close election like the 2000 election of President George W. Bush,
a handful of altered ballots could have swung the election).
165. See id. (“[A] move to a National Popular Vote for president, [preserves] the integrity of our
presidential elections for generations to come. It’s time to end the tyranny of a handful of battleground
states that suck up every dollar and ounce of candidate time, money, and energy and leave 215 million
Americans in 38 states sitting on the political sidelines.”).
166. E.g., id. (attempting to provide examples of votes counting regardless of the state party
winner).
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The Uniform Faithful Presidential Elector Act

One side note regarding a growing, current trend, although in only a small
fraction of states, is the Uniform Faithful Presidential Electors Act
(UFPEA), which is presently adopted by seven states.167 At the time of
writing this Comment in early 2021, only six states had adopted UFPEA;
however, North Dakota became the seventh state to adopt UFPEA.168 The
Uniform Faithful Presidential Electors Act, if passed would, among other
things, remove an elector from office for violating the following pledge: “If
selected for the position of elector, I agree to serve and to mark my ballots
for President and Vice President for the nominees for those offices of the
party that nominated me.”169
Along this line of power over the electors, some individuals suggest that,
because of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Chiafalo and Baca, the Court is
signaling that UFPEA is constitutional.170 However, the Court has yet to
speak on this issue.
C. The Opposition to the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact
Presently, there is great opposition to the National Popular Vote
Interstate Compact with commentators referring to this as an
unconstitutional matter.171 Further, if the NPVIC were fully enacted, it
would potentially bypass and effectively repeal any power the House and
Senate have regarding the selection of the president and vice president in

167. See 2010 Faithful Presidential Elector Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniform
laws.org/committees/community-home?communitykey=6b56b4c1-5004-48a5-add2-0c410cce587d&
tab=groupdetails [https://perma.cc/A355-N9CB] (listing the six states that have adopted the Faithful
Presidential Electors Act: Indiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, and Washington).
168. See id. (indicating that the Faithful Presidential Elector Act is presently introduced in North
Dakota).
169. See, UNIF. FAITHFUL PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS ACT § 4 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010) (stating
the pledge that electors must take) or (“Each elector nominee and alternate elector nominee of a
political party shall execute the . . . pledge . . . .”); see also 2010 Faithful Presidential Elector Act, supra
note 167 (“UFPEA has a state-administrated pledge of faithfulness . . . .”).
170. Supreme Court Unanimously Rules that States May Require Presidential Electors to Be Faithful, NAT’L
POPULAR VOTE INC., https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/supreme-court-unanimously-rulesstates-may-require-presidential-electors-be-faithful [https://perma.cc/64MV-HXY3] (arguing the
Court’s ruling in Chiafalo signals that the Uniform Faithful Presidential Elector Act is constitutional).
171. Rob Natelson, Why the “National Popular Vote” Scheme Is Unconstitutional, INDEP. INST.
(Feb. 04,
2019),
https://i2i.org/why-the-national-public-vote-scheme-is-unconstitutional/
[https://perma.cc/W7P7-YM7S] (commenting on the possibility the NPVIC is unconstitutional
without Congress approving an interstate compact or the need for a constitutional amendment).
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the event of a tie of the Electoral College.172 Thus, this would raise issues
of whether the state could curtail the powers expressly granted to the House
and Senate.
Next, the Constitution expressly prohibits states from entering interstate
compacts without the consent of Congress.173 However, this may not be
an issue because the Supreme Court has previously held that an interstate
compact does not violate the sovereign power of the United States and may
be permitted without the blessing of Congress, unless, in regards to the
compact: “[T]he clause in which [the term compact] appear[s], it is evident
that the prohibition is directed to the formation of any combination tending
to the increase of political power in the states, which may encroach upon or
interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.”174
Finally, the NPVIC is viewed as a tool to circumvent the Article V power
to amend the Constitution.175 It is noted that a national popular vote
amendment is a high hurdle to overcome in that it would likely be easily
blocked by the smaller states who appear to lose their representation under
the current Electoral College system.176

172. See id. (noting the NPVIC would eliminate the possibility of a tie in the Electoral College,
thus
bypassing the
tiebreaking
powers
of
the
House
of
Representatives);
U.S. CONST. art. II § 1 (detailing the procedures of a tie in a presidential election) or (“[I]f no person
have a majority, then from the five highest on the list the said House shall in like manner chose the
President.”); U.S. CONST. amend XII (describing how the House and Senate handle a presidential
election) or (“[I]f no person have such majority, . . . the House of Representatives shall choose
immediately, by ballot, the President.”).
173. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of
Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . .”); see also Michael S. Greve,
The Heritage Guide to the Constitution: Compact Clause, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Dec. 09, 2020),
https://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/articles/1/essays/75/compact-clause
[https://perma.cc/MB9B-MV2W] (discussing the Founders’ apprehension to states creating factions
to circumvent the protections of the Constitution).
174. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 468, (1978) (quoting Virginia
v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893)) (“[I]t was necessary to construe the terms of the Compact
Clause by reference to the object of the entire section in which it appears.”).
175. See U.S. CONST. art. V (describing the process for amending the Constitution of the United
States); The Current Threat: What Would Happen if the Electoral College Was Eliminated?, THE HERITAGE
FOUND. (Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.heritage.org/the-essential-electoral-college/the-current-threat
[https://perma.cc/E22Q-BWF8] (highlighting the way the NPVIC circumvents the amendment
process).
176. See Akhil Reed Amar, Some Thoughts on the Electoral College: Past, Present, and Future, 33 OHIO
N. U. L. REV. 467, 477 (2007) (describing how thirteen states could block the amendment process to
create a national popular vote).
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1. The NPVIC Is Not the Tool to Fix the Country’s Presidential
Electoral System
Although the focus of this Comment is the NPVIC after Chiafalo, it is
interesting to identify the other approaches proposed to “fix” the alleged
problems of the Electoral College system. Again, the Author does not
believe the Electoral College is broken, yet it is important to view the
opposing argument to identify its flaws and weaknesses. In opposition of
the NPVIC, at least one commentator contends that the NPVIC will not fix
the problem with the Electoral College, as the Electoral College system—
because of its strange nature—would not be part of a new Constitution, if
one were ever drafted in the modern day.177
Proffering that, instead of taking on the long process and headache of
passing the national popular vote in enough states to make it work, the trend
should be to pass a constitutional amendment, which would transform the
presidential election by having the winner decided by the winner of the
overall national popular vote, and thus completely abolishing the Electoral
College.178
Although the commentator pointed this out in 2019, it is not the first
time a direct popular vote has been suggested as a tool, as it has been
suggested for years.179 Presently, in light of the 2020 Presidential Election,
there are also members of Congress calling to abolish the Electoral College
and replace it with a direct election via national popular vote.180 A
constitutional amendment was introduced to this extent, as discussed prior,
in the 117th Congress, and would—if it had passed and been ratified—have
removed the need for the NPVIC and abolished the Electoral College by
making the chief executive and vice president directly elected.181 With the
177. See Williams, supra note 11 (“I have no doubt that, if we were to rewrite the Constitution
today, we would not adopt the Electoral College system that we have.”).
178. Id. (“The right way to go about jettisoning the Electoral College is to adopt an amendment
to the Constitution abolishing the college and providing for the direct election of the President based
on the national popular vote.”).
179. See Daniella Diaz, Sen. Barbara Boxer to Introduce Bill to End Electoral College, CNN (Nov. 15,
2016,
3:25 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/11/15/politics/barbara-boxer-electoral-collegedonald-trump-2016-election/index.html [https://perma.cc/722W-UR6B] (reporting a Senator
planned to introduce a bill which “would determine the winner of presidential elections by the outcome
of the popular vote.”).
180. See Lee, supra note 60 (opining that the Electoral College is broken because it has awarded
the presidency to the winner of the Electoral College when they did not win the popular vote, and
noting that the system is out of touch with modern society).
181. See H.R.J. Res. 14, 117th Cong. (2021) (calling for the direct election of the president and
vice-president, and eliminating the Electoral College, because, among other things, “the electoral

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol53/iss4/7

32

Westbrook: Faithless Electors and the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact
1245-1285_WESTBROOK_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

COMMENT

12/9/2022 2:39 PM

1277

possibility of a direct election of the president, and anything after January 6,
2021, being up in the air regarding what could happen in Washington, D.C.,
it could be a short period of time before something, like the direct election
amendment introduced in 2020, could pass and therefore dramatically
transform the electoral system.182
2. At Least One Commentator Has Noted That the NPVIC Violates a
State’s Constitution
In regard to the passage of an act enabling the National Popular Vote
Interstate Compact, one commentator has pointed out that it is directly
unconstitutional to the state enacting it because of the state’s
constitution.183 The commentator asserts this because of a specific
provision in the Colorado Constitution stating: “The general assembly shall
provide that after the year eighteen hundred and seventy-six the electors of
the electoral college shall be chosen by direct vote of the people.”184 The
clear language of this section appears to be contrary to the language of the
National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, which would give the electoral
votes to the winner of the national popular vote instead of the winner of the
direct vote in Colorado.185
Finally concluding that “[t]he NPV statute’s multistage Secretary of State
appointment scheme violates the Colorado Constitution[,] Colorado’s slate
of presidential electors must always be chosen ‘by direct vote of the
people.’”186 Although, the author asserts that there is no other provision
at play in any other state constitution regarding the required constitutional

college has become an anachronism”); see also H.R.J. Res. 7, 116th Cong. (2019) (doing the same, but
in a prior session of Congress).
182. See H.R.J. Res. 14, 117th Cong. (2021) (demonstrating the type of legislation that could be
passed to amend the Constitution to include the direct election of the president and vice president); see
also Lee, supra note 60 (reporting that the author of H.R.J. Res. 14 “cited the siege of the U.S. Capitol
[on January 6, 2021], arguing that ‘efforts can be made to manipulate the Electoral College vote using
falsehoods and shenanigans by ambitious politicians’”).
183. David B. Kopel & Hunter Hovenga, The National Popular Vote Violates the Colorado
Constitution, 98 DENV. L. REV. F. 1, 1 (2020) (“The Colorado Constitution . . . guarantees the right to
the people to direct election of presidential electors. In 2019, the general assembly enacted a statute
to violate that right.”).
184. See id. (quoting COLO. CONST. sched., § 20) (“[T]he electors of the electoral college shall
be chosen by direct vote of the people.”).
185. Id.
186. See id. at 28 (“Colorado’s slate of presidential electors must always be chosen ‘by direct
vote of the people.’”).
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direct election of presidential electors, it is interesting to note the potential
first of many areas at which the NPVIC may be challenged at a state level.187
V. CHIAFALO, THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE, AND THE FUTURE OF
FAITHLESS ELECTORS
After the Supreme Court handed down Chiafalo, the fervor and fire
behind the National Popular Vote returned, as some started to see this as a
tool that may assist in ushering in an end to the Electoral College.188 As
noted, Chiafalo is interpreted and thought to stand for the principle that, if a
state has faithless elector laws on the books, then the state may enforce
those laws against a faithless elector, whether that be removal from office
or a fine.189 Further, Chiafalo appears to lay the groundwork for state
control over electors and open the door to testing whether the National
Popular Vote Interstate Compact has the necessary constitutional
footing.190
A. Chiafalo May Mean That Any Constitutional Challenge Against the National
Popular Vote Interstate Compact Will Fail
With Chiafalo concluding that “Article II and the Twelfth Amendment
give States broad power over electors, and give electors themselves no
rights[,]” the Court provides the gateway that states—through their
legislatures—have the power to decide how an elector will act and what they
may or may not do, and further, how to punish an elector if he or she fails

187. See id. at 1 (discussing that Colorado is the only state with a constitutional provision guiding
for direct election of presidential electors by the people.).
188. Josh Gerstein & Kyle Cheney, States Can Punish “Faithless” Electors, Supreme Court Rules,
POLITICO (July 7, 2020, 10:17 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/06/supreme-courtfaithless-electors-349728 [https://perma.cc/7GJ2-UBHF] (“The effort also renewed national focus on
the creaky and untested processes that surround the Electoral College, as well as an effort by a growing
list of states to circumvent it by pledging their votes to the winner of the national popular vote.”).
189. Adam Liptalk, States May Curb ‘Faithless Electors,’ Supreme Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES
(July 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/06/us/politics/electoral-college-supreme-court.
html [https://perma.cc/P3GK-YF8E] (detailing the freedom for states to punish faithless electors, by
interpreting Chiafalo as “saying that states are entitled to remove or punish electors who changed their
votes”).
190. Andrew C. McCarthy, Supremes Signal a Brave New World of Popular Presidential Elections,
NAT’L REV. (July 11, 2020, 10:44 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/07/supremes-signala-brave-new-world-of-popular-presidential-elections/ [https://perma.cc/QF5F-DZMD] (analyzing
the danger of the decision in Chiafalo and stating that “[t]he case thus prepares the ground for future
extravagant claims of undeniable state authority to dictate how electors must vote”).
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to execute the will of those legislatures.191 At least one commentator
reviewing the Court’s decision in Chiafalo has suggested that the case may
“ease the path a bit for the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact.”192
This commentator elaborated that one of the critical issues in overcoming
the hurdle of enacting the NPVIC is that regardless of what law a state
enacts, in order for the plan to be successful, there will still need to be a
power of the state to force electors to vote as required by the compact.193
Finally, the commentator wrapped up this part of the issue by stating:
“States would need both to detach the slate of electors from party control
and to create a binding pledge directing the electors to vote for the winner
of the national popular vote.”194 To that point, a state could finally
mandate that an elector must follow the NPVIC—if adopted in the state—
or face sanctions under the applicable statute, and this would effectively take
away the voice of the people in that state.195
Further, Chiafalo’s holding, permitting states to fine or remove a person
for failing to vote as they are pledged, could signal, that even if the winner
of a state’s popular vote was of a different political party than the national
popular vote winner, a state may be able to enforce compliance to ensure
that the electors vote as they are required to under the NPVIC.196
Turning again to Chiafalo, it has been identified that Chiafalo and Baca help
the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact in several ways.197 First,
looking closely at Chiafalo, the case gives the states the power to control and
select electors as necessary.198 Further, supporters of the National Popular

191. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2328 (2020) (“Article II and the
Twelfth Amendment . . . give electors themselves no rights.”)
192. See Whittington, supra note 144, at 94 (“[T]he outcome of the faithless elector cases might
ease the path a bit for the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact.”).
193. See id. at 94–95 (“One challenge to the success of such a compact, however, is how to
ensure that presidential electors actually cast their ballots in this way.”).
194. Id. at 95.
195. See McCarthy, supra note 190; see also Whittington, supra note 144, at 67, 95 (discussing
questions and implications of binding electors).
196. See Whittington, supra note 144, at 67, 95 (“If states have no legal capacity to discourage
faithless electors, that task becomes even more complicated.”); Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2328 (“A State
follows in the same tradition if . . . it chooses to sanction an elector for breaching his promise.”).
197. Vikram David Amir, The Future of Faithless Electors and the National Popular Vote Compact:
Part Two in a Two-Part Series, JUSTIA (July 17, 2020), https://verdict.justia.com/2020/07/17/
the-future-of-faithless-electors-and-the-national-popular-vote-compact [https://perma.cc/746Y-MU
37] (discussing the benefit of the Chiafalo decision on the NPV).
198. See id. (examining the possibility that a state, post Chiafalo could simply select “electors who
are dedicated to electing the national-popular-vote-winning presidential candidate”); McPherson v.
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Vote look to the very fact that Chiafalo and Baca were decided as a guide or
indication that the Court will have a role—through the use of the precedent
started in Chiafalo and potential later precedent—to shape the future of the
Electoral College or whatever system is in place.199
Directly after the announcement of the decision in Chiafalo v. Washington,
the Congressional Research Service released a report analyzing Chiafalo and
concluded that the Court’s holding may “suggest [the National Popular Vote
Interstate Compact], if enacted, would survive constitutional challenge.”200
This conclusion is further supported by the concluding sentence of
Justice Kagan’s decision for the Court in Chiafalo, by declaring that the
People or the legislatures of the several states make the ultimate decision.201
The directly beneficial line for the future of the National Popular Vote
may again come from the concluding paragraph of the opinion, in which
Justice Kagan elaborates:
The Electors’ constitutional claim has neither text nor history on its side.
Article II and the Twelfth Amendment give States broad power over electors
and give electors themselves no rights. Early in our history, States decided to tie
electors to the presidential choices of others, whether legislatures or citizens.
Except that legislatures no longer play a role, that practice has continued for
more than 200 years. Among the devices States have long used to achieve
their object are pledge laws, designed to impress on electors their role as
agents of others. A State follows in the same tradition if, like Washington, it
chooses to sanction an elector for breaching his promise. Then too, the State
instructs its electors that they have no ground for reversing the vote of
millions of its citizens. That direction accords with the Constitution—as well
as with the trust of a Nation that here, We the People rule.202

Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) (indicating the power of the state legislature to control and select the
elector).
199. Amir, supra note 197 (noting that the Court by deciding Chiafalo, “implicitly reject[ed] the
idea that disputes over the operation of the electoral college are so-called ‘political questions’ that only
states and Congress can resolve”).
200. See JACOB D. SHELLY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10515, SUPREME COURT CLARIFIES
RULES FOR ELECTORAL COLLEGE: STATES MAY RESTRICT FAITHLESS ELECTORS 4 (2020)
(“By affirming that Article II allows each state to appoint electors ‘in whatever way it likes,’ the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Chiafalo could be read to suggest the plan, if enacted, would survive
constitutional challenge.”).
201. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2328 (2020) (“[T]he State instructs its electors
that they have no ground for reversing the vote of millions of its citizens. That direction accords with
the Constitution—as well as with the trust of a Nation that here, We the People rule.”).
202. Id. (emphasis added).
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In reaching such conclusion, Justice Kagan noted that “[s]tates decided to
tie electors to the presidential choices of others, whether legislatures or
citizens . . . [e]xcept that legislatures no longer play a role,” thereby leaving
open the question of whether the legislature, by adopting the National
Popular Vote Interstate Compact, may have the power to tie the electors, or
if that decision as to who the president is, is solely tied to the people.203
This is because the people elect the state legislatures, thus making the actions
of the legislature effectively, the will of the people.
Therefore, the question is raised as to whether the legislatures can, in fact,
enact a law on behalf of the people that would make their votes only matter
if their votes matched that of the national popular vote winner. Regardless,
this opinion now leaves open questions about the true extent of the power
of legislatures and opens the door for further debate regarding whether
legislatures can constitutionally bind presidential electors in a way contrary
to the Electoral College scheme.204
B. The Decision in Chiafalo Could Signal That the Court Would Strike Down
the NPVIC
As a result of the Chiafalo decision, some commentators have suggested
that Chiafalo is the Court signaling that the Court cares for the will of the
voters, and that by allowing states to punish faithless electors, the Court may
be signaling that it will strike down a NPVIC challenge, if and when the
requisite number of states sign the compact.205 Further, Chiafalo, being, a
signal that the Court is willing to uphold the NPVIC, is solely one side of
the argument, and it is not clear whether the Court will uphold the NPVIC
when faced with the challenge.206
203. Id.
204. As a note, this Comment does not analyze the implications of the Equal Protection Clause
and the principle of “one person, one vote.” See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (“A citizen’s
right to a vote free of arbitrary impairment by state action has been judicially recognized as a right
secured by the Constitution . . . .”); see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964) (“Readers surely
could have fairly taken this to mean, ‘one person, one vote.’”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558
(1964) (“The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s
Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one
thing—one person, one vote.”).
205. Kyle Sammin, The Supreme Court Just Confirmed The Electoral College Is Here To Stay,
THE FEDERALIST (July 9, 2020), https://thefederalist.com/2020/07/09/the-supreme-courtconfirmed-the-electoral-college-here-to-stay/ [https://perma.cc/X3HF-GF2W] (speculating the
decision in Chiafalo is actually the Court desiring to keep the will of the people).
206. Michael Abramowicz, The Faithless Electors Decision Doesn’t End the Possibility of Constitutional
Crisis, REASON (July 6, 2020, 1:04 PM) https://reason.com/volokh/2020/07/06/the-faithless-
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For a self-evident example of what is now recognized, consider that,
although the Court has given (under Chiafalo) great latitude to state
legislatures to create the rules by which the states assign electors, under the
Guarantee Clause, the Supreme Court could find that the NPVIC violates
the Constitution.207 Or, there may be a further area of the Constitution,
which has not been addressed yet, that the NPVIC would fail to comport.
However, Chiafalo did not attempt to answer the question of whether the
Court would decide if the NPVIC did violate the Constitution, and as such,
this leaves open the question of whether the NPVIC—once reaching the
necessary electoral vote promises from the several states—would survive a
direct constitutional attack by opponents.208
Lastly, at least one legal commentator has concluded that the decision in
Chiafalo should not be construed as the Court permitting state legislatures to
enter a compact to give their vote to the winner of the national popular
vote.209 The commentator asserted this argument by stating that “one
might reasonably conclude that because the situation was not before the
Court, nothing in the opinion should be taken to permit the states to choose
electors who are bound to support the candidate chosen by some set of
people outside the state.”210
C. The Use of Chiafalo in Election Litigation Post-2020 Election
At the time of writing this Comment in early 2021, only a few cases have
relied upon Chiafalo, but the likelihood of this case seeing real world
application will dramatically increase should there be an issue with the
electors during or after the 2024 (or any future) election. First, for example,
Chiafalo is standing for the principle that states have a far-reaching power
over the electors as they track a state’s popular vote.211 Further, Chiafalo
advocates the principle that states have the power to control electors, and
electors-decision-doesnt-end-the-possibility-of-constitutional-crisis/#
[https://perma.cc/
KR9X-8CS4] (noting it is unanswered whether the NPVIC would survive constitutional scrutiny under
various forms of analysis).
207. See id. (questioning whether a state could promise its electors); see also U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government . . . .”).
208. Abramowicz, supra note 206 (concluding Chiafalo did not answer the final question of
whether the Court would find the NPVIC in violation of the Constitution).
209. Hartnett, supra note 47, at 468.
210. Id.
211. Baten v. McMaster, 967 F.3d 345, 355 (4th Cir. 2020), as amended (July 27, 2020) (discussing
that Chiafalo enforces that the states have a strong power over controlling their electors).
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the process for which electors in states are selected.212 Additionally, in a
surprising case from December 2020, Chiafalo was cited in a discussion over
whether the State of Wisconsin violated its own state laws with the
“manner” in which electors for the 2020 election were selected.213 Again,
flowing from the 2020 Presidential Election, in Georgia, the “manner” of
election was also challenged.214
In answering these questions, though Chiafalo did not play a central role,
both courts looked to the words of Justice Thomas when discussing that the
use of the term “manner” in the Constitution is solely related to the form in
which the electors are selected by the states.215 If anything is to be taken
from these cases, it is the observation that, in less than a year since the
handing down of Chiafalo, the case has played a role in two election challenge
cases, and most likely this will be only the beginning of its use.216
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the opinion of the Court in Chiafalo sets a dangerous
precedent. The Court gave the states the power to control and to remove
212. See Rodriguez v. Newsom, 974 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 2020) (indicating Chiafalo
reenforces the idea that states cannot select electors in violation of the Constitution’s protections such
as the equal protection clause); see also Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2324 n.4 (2020)
(“A State, for example, cannot select its electors in a way that violates the Equal Protection Clause.
And if a State adopts a condition on its appointments that effectively imposes new requirements on
presidential candidates, the condition may conflict with the Presidential Qualifications Clause.”)
(internal citation omitted).
213. See Trump v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, 506 F. Supp. 3d 620, 636(E.D. Wis. 2020), aff’d,
983 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2020) (using Chiafalo as part of the analysis as to whether the state of Wisconsin
improperly selected manners).
214. See Trump v. Kemp, 511 F. Supp. 3d 1325, 1336–37 (N.D. Ga. 2021) (“Plaintiff argues
that Defendants’ alleged violation of Georgia election laws means that the ‘manner’ for choosing
electors established by the legislature was not followed and is in violation of Article II of the U.S.
Constitution.”).
215. See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2330 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Article II requires state
legislatures merely to set the approach for selecting Presidential electors, not to impose substantive
limitations on whom may become an elector.”); Wisconsin Elections Comm’n, 506 F. Supp. 3d at 637 (“Put
another way, [manner] refers simply to ‘the mode of appointing electors—consistent with the plain
meaning of the term.’” (quoting Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2330 (Thomas, J., concurring))); Kemp, 511 F.
Supp. 3d at 1337 (“[R]equires state legislatures merely to set the approach for selecting Presidential
electors.”) (quoting Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2330 (Thomas, J., concurring)).
216. See generally Kemp, 511 F. Supp. 3d at 1336–37 (“This argument confuses and conflates the
‘manner’ of appointing presidential electors—by popular election—with underlying rules of election
administration.”); Wisconsin Elections Comm’n, 506 F. Supp. 3d at 637 (“Absent proof that defendants
failed to follow this ‘Manner’ of determining the state’s Presidential Electors, plaintiff has not and
cannot show a violation of the Electors Clause.”).
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electors who failed to cast their votes in accordance with the candidate who
won their state’s electoral votes.217 However, with the growth of the
National Popular Vote now in sixteen jurisdictions, there are questions as
to whether the Supreme Court, when faced with a challenge to this interstate
compact, would hold that the Compact was in violation of the
Constitution.218 Additionally, with the possibility that the NPVIC may
violate state constitutions, there will be rigorous debate and challenges
brought forth over the true power of state legislatures to assign electors
under the National Popular Vote.219 Without a doubt, enacting the NPVIC
in more states will invite a tremendous amount of litigation over whether
the national popular vote and NPVIC is constitutional.220 Nevertheless,
keeping in mind the instruction of the Court, that it is the power of the state
legislatures to appoint the electors, may well prove that the states have the
power to implement the NPVIC.221
In closing, the words of Justice Kagan should echo through the debate
across the nation regarding whether the various state legislatures may assign
their electors to either the winner of the state’s popular vote or to the overall
national popular vote winner, that as long as “[t]hat direction accords with
the Constitution—as well as with the trust of a Nation that here[—]We the
People rule.”222 However, we must keep in mind that our august Founding
Fathers used every ounce of their sagacity to develop a system where we no
longer had to fear the tyranny of the majority or a dark cabal of bad actors
seeking to dictate every aspect to a group they deemed inferior. The system
in place quelled several of the fears of wise men, such as Mr. George Mason,
217. See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2328 (“Among the devices States have long used to achieve their
object are pledge laws, designed to impress on electors their role as agents of others. A State follows
in the same tradition if, like Washington, it chooses to sanction an elector for breaching his promise.”);
see also Gerstein & Cheney, supra note 188 (describing the link between the Chiafalo decision and the
National Popular Vote).
218. See Agreement Among the States, supra note 154 (noting that sixteen jurisdictions have adopted
the NPVIC and pledge their votes to the overall winner of the national popular vote); Natelson, supra
note 171 (commenting on the possibility the NPVIC is unconstitutional without Congress approving
an interstate compact or the need for a constitutional amendment).
219. Kopel & Hovenga, supra note 183.
220. See Williams, supra note 11 (“Yes, that may be politically difficult, but it would be far
preferable for supporters of the NPVC to put their political muscle into that effort than the adoption
of the NPVC, which would usher in a far more politically fraught and litigious era of presidential
elections.”).
221. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) (noting that from the founding of our
Republic that Article II, Section 1 vests the state legislatures with the power to appoint electors).
222. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2338 (emphasis added); see Whittington, supra note 144, at 67, 92
(discussing the future of faithless electors post the Chiafalo decision).
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and we should head their warnings and zealously guard the protections they
put in place to ensure that the people are sovereign over the national
government.223

223. See RECORDS, supra note 1, at 500 (noting Mr. Mason feared the cabal from being able to
usurp the will of the states).
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